Wednesday, December 11 2013

 

According to the latest poll conducted
by RUH,
89% out of 93 polled mass media outlets called President Ilham Aliyev a Friend
of the Press.

The
formal attitude of Ilham Aliyev  to our
press is not so much bad. He introduces himself to journalists from rather good
sides.  Naturally, when having contacts
with the press, he tries to be as tactical as possible. Over the presidential
race before the election when he was elected the president for the third time,
Aliyev gave the known journalists a many-storeyed building with apartment
houses. Of course, this played a great part when Aliyev was recognized as
"Friend of Press". On the other hand, several journalists were
sentenced for many years during Aliyev's tenure. Many others were beaten during
rallies and lawsuits were filed against them. They became objects of violence
by the law-enforcement agencies. By the way, no police officer has been brought
responsible for beating journalists yet.

To be short, a stick and carrot policy is applied
regarding journalists…

Sure, Aliev knows how to give joy to
people. He presents journalists with flats, the Press Council –with a new
office. There is a special fund that issues grants to the press. It was the
PressCouncil that defined Aliyev as a Friend of the Press.

What
has changed in the human rights field in Azerbaijan since the beginning of
Aliyev's third term in office?

The
situation has become a little better. In Baku they are well aware that last
presidential election were fraudulent. 
For this reason, the authorities started the dialogue with political
parties and the president with journalists. There has never been such a situation
even during Heydar Aliyev's tenure. That is to say, all these improvements are
not at all evidence of the true changes in the local policy. Azerbaijan still
has many problems linked with democracy, and the last presidential election
deepened them more.  International
institutions criticized Azerbaijani authorities for that.

Do you anticipate any fundamental changes
in the Karabakh peace process after Armenia's accession to the CU?

In
Azerbaijan they are concerned over Armenia's upcoming accession to Russia-led
Customs Union. In Baku they used to blame Russia for supporting Armenia. Now,
there are indications that after Armenia's accession to the CU, Moscow will get
even more solid levers of influence on the Karabakh conflict's resolution. In
Baku they are seriously concerned over possible deployment of Russian
peacekeepers on the line of contact of the conflicting parties. This will
become a strong argument for Moscow to increase pressure on Azerbaijan.

What dangers will deployment of Russian
militaries lead to?

Moscow will get an additional mechanism of
pressure on both Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is widely believed that Armenia is joining the CU
to finally gain a foothold in Karabakh at the cost of its sovereignty.

Quite lately, Arif Ragimzade, the head
of the Azerbaijani Parliament Committee for Regional Affairs declared that
Azerbaijan could more actively involve in establishment of the Eurasian Union,
but for Armenia’s decision to join it. 
Don’t you think that Azerbaijan could prevent 'Armenia's final
establishment in Karabakh' by participating in Putin's projects?

The
CU is economically unviable for Azerbaijan. Nearly 95% of Azerbaijan's export
is oil, which is delivered to Europe and not to Russia. Over 45% of
Azerbaijan's investments are in Turkey and Georgia. Only 2%-3% of Azerbaijan's
investments are in Russia. From the political point of view, in Baku they are
well aware that even if Azerbaijan joins the CU already tomorrow, Moscow will
hardly 'help' it get back Nagorno Karabakh.

We
are well aware that Russia is interested in the status quo in our region.
Making curtseys to Moscow, Azerbaijan will not get Karabakh as part of it.
Consequently, Baku sees no benefit from participation in Moscow's Eurasian
projects.

 

Despite its participation in the
"Eastern partnership" project, Azerbaijan was not going to develop it
through initialing of the Association Agreement with the EU.  By conducting "the policy of
non-alignment" Aliyev keeps the distance both from Moscow and Brussels.
What phobias such policy is based on?  

 

Since
the last events in Ukraine I have started understanding Ilham Aliyev’s caution
regarding Azerbaijan's participation in various integration projects.  First, President of Azerbaijan understands
very well that any sharp step towards Moscow or Brussels will result in
activation of the opposition in Azerbaijan and split the society into two
parts. It will be rather hard for him to keep the power in such a situation.
Therefore, caution is the basis of Aliyev's tactics. He understands very well
that Azerbaijan is in the periphery of different interests.  And its any sharp step may irritate Russia,
Europe, Iran, Turkey, the USA, Georgia and Armenia. For this reason, Aliyev is
forced to tack and go slowly. Such a policy is dictated by the fear of the
Azerbaijani society too.

Your statements run contrary to many
radical and aggressive statements Aliyev has made against Armenia. A new war in
Karabakh is the most radical step Azerbaijan may make in its foreign policy…

Numerous
radical statements by Ilham Aliyev about the readiness "to take Karabakh
back" are directed at local users. In fact, he says it only when making a
speech for the local audience. This rhetoric is an interior actions plan. He
sees numerous omissions and lost opportunities of Azerbaijan over the
negotiating process, and it is hard for him to agree to losing Karabakh once
and forever. This is the reason of the reaction linked with purchasing of new
armament and the appearance of Turkish and Israeli military consultants in
Azerbaijan.

They
do that to raise mood in the society  and
demonstrate that the project of Karabakh returning is still relevant today, and
it is in the center of the power's attention. Aliyev does not abandon the
negotiating process, as he understands that in case of abandoning meetings with
Sargsyan, he will be forced to take another step. Caution is Aliyev's credo. He
understands that any sharp step is not in his interests.

The situation around Iran has rapidly
changing. What consequences Iran's change from America's enemy No.1 to a loyal
partner may have on its neighbors?

Until
recently our authorities were afraid that a conflict over Iran might cause an
inflow of Azeri refugees to Azerbaijan. Now this sword of Damocles seems to be
no longer hanging over u. As a partner of the United States and Israel,
Azerbaijan could not refuse them to use its capacities, and this annoyed Iran.
Now that the Americans have come to terms with the Iranians through the agency
of the Russians, we can take a sigh of relief and can no longer fear that the
Iranians may wish to discredit us.

But
this has a reverse side: Azerbaijan has only 1% of the world's oil, while Iran
enjoys almost 10%. Azerbaijan was regarded as attractive just because there
were no relations with Iran. Now the Americans may lose interest in us. We do
not want to integrate into any alliance. We just want to finish our
infrastructure and energy projects. The new Iran will inevitably reduce the
world's interest in Azerbaijan's oil and gas. Formerly the best house in the
village was ours, now it is they who are building the best house. So, very soon
we will have to reduce our ambitions.