Wednesday, July 13 2016 12:20

 

In Armenia they generally speak of the military consequences of the April war – 800 ha of lost territories and nearly a hundred deaths, but they do not speak of the changes in the status quo of 1994 and the post-April diplomatic activities around Karabakh. Do you think those responsible for the foreign policy of Armenia have drawn the relevant conclusions?  

 

Amid the lack of background information, I refrain from public conclusions and statements. Today we are simply unaware what is really going on around Karabakh. At the same time, it is not clear why the Azerbaijani army was able to advance in April and why our army was short of arms and ammunition. We are well aware of the fact that other links of public administration - particularly, diplomacy, which is fairly criticized here - fail to work effectively. But the fact that our victorious and flawless army has proved to be far from being flawless became an unpleasant surprise for many people. April 2016 saw what Joseph S. Nye, Jr. - American expert who developed a number of directions in neo-liberalism - wrote in his theses long ago. In particular, along with hard power and even soft power, smart power has also become quite relevant today. And the saying "All brawn and no brains" is no longer relevant. Today one can have a big power but fail to be victorious.

 

Can this theory be applicable to the Karabakh conflict parties? 

 

Anyway, we perfectly realize that small countries like Armenia cannot have reserves capable of finally defeating the neighboring country.  Here the vital need arises to manipulate smart power," he says.

 

Do you think the April war was just a cast of the die?

 

I cannot say so. At the same time, I do not even want to think that someone, for instance, Russia might have deliberately instigated the conflicting parties to escalate the conflict and suffer senseless losses. It is totally wrong to speak of Russia's anti-Armenian collusion with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Either I have no idea of the politics or there is no collusion, because such a collusion would run counter to the interests of Russia itself. In addition, Moscow has numerous problems and it is not going to lose Armenia as its last strategic ally amid the situation in Ukraine and Syria, where Russia's affairs are far from being good.  In this light, Moscow has made a decision on reconciliation with Erdogan, because life is not a bed of roses.

 

But I do not think you will deny that it is the indistinct Russian stand on the April events – the equal mark Moscow put between the aggressor and the victim of aggression - that had a negative effect on the public opinion about Russia.     

 

This is a slightly different matter. However, when talking to my Russian colleagues, I always point out that Moscow makes numerous mistakes in its foreign and domestic policy. The April statements of Dmitry Rogozin and Dmitry Medvedev are direct evidence of it. Many in Moscow do not simply want to understand that such statements against Armenia and Armenian people run counter to the interests of Russia, first of all. The Russia-Armenia relations are now characterized as relations between a vassal and a sovereign and any insignificant problem related to Armenia is instantly exaggerated in Moscow. At the same time, Moscow speaks an absolutely different language with Tbilisi simply because Georgians behave in a totally different manner.

 

So, can we say that the vertical relations with Moscow are our own authorities' fault?

 

These two problems are certainly closely connected and complementary. There are also the problems of Armenian oligarchy and the problems of Armenian corruption in the power. The inclination to regularly put one's hand in the state's pocket while holding a high position causes difficulties in negotiations with the Russian colleagues. At the same time, I should point out that the situation in Russia is not better.  Whenever I am told that the reason of such a situation in Armenia is that 'we have no money', I always say 'we have no brains'.

 

Earlier you mentioned that the Armenian Foreign Ministry should work with at least a dozen countries which are potentially ready to recognize the NKR’s independence after Armenia itself recognizes it. Does the Foreign Ministry fail to do it for specific external reasons or it is because of the passive Armenian diplomacy?    

 

I think it is the second reason. A mistake of a diplomat costs lives, so, a diplomat should make no mistakes.  

 

How many lives did the latest mistakes of the Armenian Foreign Ministry cost?

 

At least a hundred lives of our guys, who were killed in early April.

 

What can you say about the potential of our foreign policy?

 

We should completely revise our diplomacy. Armenian diplomacy should be in tune with the times. XXI century is a century of diplomatic revolution, revolution in methods and methodology.  

 

What diplomacy should we have in XXI century?

 

We should strengthen national security and statehood. A system approach is needed. It is impossible to improve the activities of the Foreign Ministry without removing the flaws in the public administration. After all, diplomacy is the continuation of domestic policy. Therefore, our problems are first of all inside the system.     

 

What are the theoretical ways out?  

 

I will only say that everyone should do his/her job: a shoemaker should make shoes, a diplomat should be engaged in diplomacy and a thief should be in jail.