Sunday, May 1 2016 04:55

 

What would say about the reasons and results of the “four-day war”?

 

My attitude towards the core of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has not changed since 1988. The conflict, which was in a latent phase, was skillfully activated by the Kremlin, developed to a hot phase and frozen in 1994 after the Kremlin achieved the favorable configuration and balance of forces in the region. Since then Moscow has been the suzerain of Armenia and Azerbaijan, governing the region by means of a controllable conflict.  This is a classical imperial policy. As the core of the conflict has not changed, the Russia-initiated developments in the South Caucasus have not changed either. The authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan have understood that any deviation from Moscow's path is punished. It has always been so. Armenia needs no war - it has already taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and almost entire Greater Karabakh. But if it receives an order from Moscow, it will have to carry it out. The same is true about Azerbaijan - the second leud of Russia in the South Caucasus after Armenia. That being said, the four-day upsurge in violence along the line of contact is Moscow's initiative aimed at achieving its own goals. What are these goals? I think there are several goals. First, the President of Russia seeks to overcome the political isolation and demonstrate that Russia has significant military and political resources in several important regions of the world. It wants to play a role of a peacekeeper in the South Caucasus as well, after Ukraine and Syria. Second, the lack of meetings and negotiations has created an impression that Russia's resources to influence the conflict 'settlement' process are running short. Following the escalation in early April, the Russian Foreign Ministry can position itself as the main "fixer", with the US and French diplomats being forced to restrict their activities to the observers' role. Third, Russia is trying to impose on Armenia and Azerbaijan the previously rejected option of deployment of 'peacekeeping forces' in Karabakh, i.e. to create the situation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the run- up to 08.08.08. Fourth, the escalation encourages Armenia and Azerbaijan to purchase Russian weapons more actively.  

 

Russia easily stopped the April war, inviting the chiefs of General Staffs of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Armed Forces to Moscow. This once again demonstrated that the Karabakh conflict, as well as the authorities in Yerevan and Baku are controllable. Aren't Washington and Brussels interested in the South Caucasus any longer?     

 

The West is very much interested in the South Caucasus. This is proved by a variety of projects and initiatives in economy, politics and security. It is another matter that tango is a partner dance and the South Caucasus partners of the West are so strongly leg-shackled by Russia that any attempt of flirtation with the West is fraught with 'organisational decision making' in Moscow. Both the South Caucasus leaders and the Western politicians realize this well enough.  Therefore, Washington and Brussels are keeping a low profile. They do not rush the things. They perfectly see the vector of development - or, rather, retrogression - of Russia and they understand that in such a situation it is more favorable to be patient and wait rather than yield to the temptation of dangerous activity.          

 

Some Russian experts saw a Turkish trace in the “four-day war”. Who do you think really benefited from the hundreds of deaths on both sides?    

 

Everyone benefited from the escalation, except the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. I understand that many stars of Russian propaganda have got it off their chest, speaking about cunning Turkey and angel-like Russia. But this propaganda has no real impact on politics and one should not take it seriously. 

 

The Armenian president has recently said that he sees no possibility of deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the Karabakh conflict zone. He noted that the Russian troops can find themselves in the conflict zone on the invitation of one of the sides at least. May Baku send such an invitation?    

 

Russian troops have gained a foothold in Armenia. There are no Russian troops in Azerbaijan yet, unless one takes into account the Armenian army, which actually carries out Moscow's plans and tasks in Karabakh. It is another matter that many in Armenia are either unaware of it or aware but reluctant to confess it. The Azerbaijani authorities have no desire to limit their sovereignty through deployment of Russian troops in the de jure Azerbaijani territory, especially as everyone remembers Russia's annexation of the Georgian territories under the guise of 'protection of Russian peacekeepers'.

 

How would you describe the core and the goals of the current Russian policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey? 

 

Russia's policy is out of date and counterproductive both in the South Caucasus and towards Turkey and Iran. The reason of such a desperate condition of Russia's foreign policy is the inefficiency of Russia's internal arrangement. The political field of Russia is an intellectual desert. Does it sound paradoxical?  Yes, it does, given the huge intellectual potential of Russian people. But this regime needs no smart or honest people. Much is spoken and written about the Russian policy of keeping the South Caucasus countries under control by means of controllable conflicts. As regards Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin has brought to naught his entire extensive policy of building strong economic and political relations with Turkey within just a year. Who benefited from demonstration of such a 'cool behavior'? It is obvious that neither Russians nor Turks did. Putin has damaged relations with Ukraine and Turkey and this is considered as a huge foreign political achievement of the Obama administration. For its part, Iran is far from showing confidence in Russia and the reason is not only the history. Present-day Russia's policy itself is full of proofs demonstrating what an unreliable partner and ally Russia is. In the long run, Russia always proves to be the losing side.