Tuesday, April 16 2013

Judging
by meetings of Russian Deputy FM Grigory Karasin and Georgian Special
Representative for Russia Zurab Abashidze, Moscow is currently trying to build
relations with new authorities in Tbilisi. Do you see any risks for the
Georgian Dream and Georgia in this cooperation?

 Everything
depends on the extent of that cooperation. 
There are red lines nobody is going to cross, such as diplomatic
relations or the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, and this
is exactly what may pose some risks for our country.

 Is
Georgian Dream free in decision-making and from the pressure of Washington and
Brussels on Saakashvili?

 No
one is free from pressure. Today Georgian Dream is less dependent on the West
than Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is, but dependence is not always
bad, especially when things are moving in the right direction.

 Minister
for Reintegration of Georgia Paata Zakareishvili characterized the perspectives
of restoration of the Abkhazian section of the railway as an idea that was not
negotiated for. He cast doubt on readiness of Moscow to study the railway issue
and directly linked it to revision of Russia’s policy on Abkhazia’s
independence. Can one suppose that restoration of the Abkhazian railway is not
on agenda of Tbilisi but ’a bait’ for Moscow?

 I think the issue was raised seriously, but without necessary
preliminary processing. It has become clear that Georgia
does not need the restart of the Abkhazian railway for the moment but may well
need additional transportation lines in the near future.

 At a glance, change of power in Georgia seems to open new opportunities
for total change of the dividing lines in the region. In Georgia they are
seriously concerned over the country’s dependence on the Turkish-Azerbaijani
transit and influence of those countries on Georgia.  Now, Georgia together with Russia, Armenia
and Iran can theoretically make a geopolitical breach of the situation in the
region forming a new north-south axis and get rid of that dependence. Why
doesn’t Tbilisi display interest in such large-scale project?

 The Georgian
authorities are not very much concerned over their dependence on the
Turkish-Azeri transit and do not seem to be very much interested in the project
to form a north-south axis from Russia through Georgia and Armenia to Iran. I
think these are just hopes. And Tbilisi thinks in the same way judging by the
low interest it displays in the project.

 NATO
represented by Turkey influences Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Armenia is a CSTO member. Georgia strives for
NATO. Is it right to say that Russia’s influence on the South Caucasus is
maintained only at the expense of Armenia, while the balance of forces is in
favor of NATO?

 Armenia
is also active in cooperating with NATO, and nobody there seems to be eager to
join the newly formed Eurasian structures. Armenia simply has no alternative to
being part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and is no less eager
to be part of the West. Armenia is one of the ways for Russia to realize its
influence on our region, but let's not forget that Russia's key friends are the
army and the navy.

 All
regional projects involving Turkey and Azerbaijan aim to even more oust
Armenia. Is Georgia interested in Armenia’s isolation given that it is the key
transit country for those projects? 

 I think you overestimate Armenia’s role in
the plans and interests of Georgia. I do
not think that Armenia's isolation - something Georgia's key partners Turkey
and Azerbaijan are trying to realize - is not a priority or even a goal for
Georgia - even though this process might give the country certain benefits.

 One
should not overestimate Armenia's role in Georgia's plans and priorities. Just
like Armenia, Georgia pursues its own goals, and these goals have western
rather than northern orientation. I would rather not advise Armenia on how to
overcome this isolation, but the roots of this problem are certainly not in
Georgia.