V. KAZIMIROV: "BREAKTHROUGH IN RAMBOUILLET WOULD BE A LEAP IN THE DARK IF THE PUBLIC IS NOT PREPARED BEFOREHAND

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 6. ARMINFO. Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents, Robert Kocharyan and Ilham Aliyev, are expected to meet in Rambouillet, Paris, on 10-11 February. In this connection, ARMINFO applied for the former Russian co- chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, acknowledged specialist in Karabakh subject- matter, Vladimir Kazimirov, for comments on the expectations and possible results of the meeting in the context of intensified negotiations for settlement of Karabakh conflict.

What is your assessment of the regular talks about "the window of opportunities" in the settlement of the conflict? Do you think real the recently activated statements on possible resolution of the conflict in the current year and the "breakthrough" at the meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Rambouillet?

There is really a window of relative opportunities for 2006, but it is unbelievable that Ilham Alieyv and Robert Kocharyan will use it and "jump out" of the conflict frames. Impartial opportunities are not enough. A strong political will and thorough work inside the public are required in order that the public perceives the inevitability of mutual concessions for the parties to meet somewhere on the half-way. Such a "breakthrough" in Rambouillet would be a leap in the dark if the public is not prepared beforehand. Do you agree with the opinion that creation of a model for settlement of conflicts is possible?

Do you think that all the conflicts in the post-Soviet area can be equalized or you think that every conflict is unique and requires a specific approach?

One should avoid both the extremes, the search for a single mould for the conflicts neglecting their specifics and the absolutization of each conflict making it unique and neglecting any commonness. The specifics must be taken into account, indeed, but one should not forget that all these conflicts originated or have became aggravated in the background of powerful shocks - during the collapse of the USSR or Yugoslavia.

It explains the inability of the international community to insert the settlement of these conflicts in of standards registered in Helsinki not for such force-majour circumstances, but to overcome the aftermath of the World War I and to support normal relations of the countries. irrespective of their regimes. It is like demanding imperishability of the inner walls of a collapsing building during an earthquake. Neither the norms of navigation are used during a storm.

Conflicts must not be settled on the basis of a "favorite" principle (right to self-determination or territorial integrity). Moreover, two quite different principles become weighty: peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-use of force or threatening with force.

What is the role of national and international NGOs in the settlement of Karabakh conflict? The International Crisis Group is in question. The article by the research officer of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, the expert of the Strategic Culture Foundation, Andrey Areshev, brings an unequivocal information on the "pro-Turkish" orientation of the ICG. Do you agree with this?

I can see the role of national NGOs in it rather than the international ones. Three months ago I made a special call for activation of Armenian and Azerbaijani NGOs before 2006 and its "window of opportunities." It requires revival of the national diplomacy, elementary contacts of Azerbaijanis and Armenians, a reasoned repulse of noisy pseudo-patriots and those who implant isolation of the two neighboring peoples and thoughtlessly call for a new war.

International NGOs could contribute to restoration of these contacts rather than propose settlement ways. And the ICG is absorbed just by the last, with its schemes often not being in accordance with the conflict nature. Let alone the improper, "directive" tone of recommendations of ICG representatives and their shameless lobbying of EU interests.

Andrey Areshev brought many facts on the personnel of ICG leadership, their ties and propensity. Not disputing this, I pay much attention to the essence of its proposals. I prefer neither admitting everything at once nor rejecting, but separating the useful and the useless, and sometime the unfavorable. For example, the first report of ICG quite uselessly describes the conflict as inter-community. The Armenians of Karabakh confronted with Baku rather than with the Azerbaijani community of Nagorny Karabakh. On the other hand, it is useful to introduce the idea of an additional referendum for the status of Nagorny Karabakh and that of the inadmissibility of resumption of military actions (though the military actions are insufficiently worked out and the chance of their resumption within the nearest future is evidently overestimated.)

Whether the special services of super powers have their part in the conflict's settlement?

I think the role of the special services in the settlement of the conflict is insignificant. However, they can use the conflict environment for their own purposes. The role of diplomacy and propaganda is much higher but different so far. If the propaganda helped or at least did not prevent diplomatic efforts, the situation would be different. NGOs have a little part, but could or rather should become an "antidote" for the present harmful propaganda.

Do you think necessary dislocation of international peacemaking forces in the zone of the Karabakh conflict? If yeas, so who can join the peacemaking mission given the statements of the Armenian party on inadmissibility of Turkish troops in Nagorny Karabakh and the Azerbaijan's demands for nonparticipation of OSCE MG member-countries in the peacemaking mission?

Both the questions depend, first of all, on the conflicting parties. They must judge if they are able to independently enforce the agreements everyone has waited for for so many years. The last experience is not encouraging. During the 18 years of the conflict, only three agreements were reached and only one of them is observed and even improperly. Let alone that during the military actions the agreements on their limitation or suspension were broken more frequently than observed, especially by one party. And all this in conditions of comparative statics. What will be in the dynamics of stage by stage fulfillment of future agreements? After all, it is like shedding of one or several cogs of a pinion i.e. the mechanism no longer works, it stops.

The first issue must be solved, at first. That is, whether the conflict's settlement need peacemakers. Beforehand, an agreement on key issues or at least an approach to their solution is necessary. Only after this the national staff of peacemakers must be determined. It will require agreement of all the conflicting parties.

If the settlement of the conflict without participation of Nagorny Karabakh in the talks is possible despite the statements that "Armenia is its guarantor"? Doesn't it like a "divorce suit" when the opinion of a child is not important.

I came out for participation of all the conflicting parties in the negotiation process long ago. At the beginning of the talks Nagorny Karabakh participated both in the conflict and the talks. I think deviation from this was the mistake of the Armenian diplomacy and the feebleness of OSCE which agreed to work in the present inferior format. After all, Budapest Summit of OSCE instructed the Minsk Group co-chairmen to hold negotiations between the conflicting parties and not between the recognized countries only. This instruction is dated December 6 1994. It has not been fulfilled for already many years, and OSCE cannot even insist on the decision of its supreme summit despite the fact that it was made with direct participation of the former presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, H. Aliyev and L. Ter-Petrossyan.

I am greatly surprised at the statement by OSCE CIO Karel de Gucht at a press conference on January 24 when he tried to reason the non-participation of Nagorny Karabakh in the talks by its unrecognized status. After all, it is not a UN membership, and there are dozens of UN member-states who does not recognized each other. Is it possible that before the visit to Yerevan and Baku the experienced Belgian diplomacy did not inform its minister, who occupies so high position at OSCE, either of the Budapest Summit, or of the history of the talks, or of the practice of participation of the conflicting parties and not only the recognized states in the settlement of conflicts.

Is it possible to stop the militarist statements by Baku and to make the peoples "friendly"? Do you believe in the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the foreseeable future?

It is very desirable that the two peoples become friends, but it is difficult, especially when some people intentionally cultivate distrust and hostility between them.

The flow of militarist statements by official Baku can be stopped only by their systematic condemnation. Azerbaijan has no own force for this: the wild idea of revenge is actively campaigned although in reality it is a self-incitement in the style of the Organization of Karabakh Liberation. The press (mainly the Azerbaijani one) should form a full register of such statements (like "by all means possible," "at any price," "the patience is not unlimited" etc..) by the influential persons and to publish it and even send to influential international organizations. It will to some extent calm down speech-writers and officials.

But, despite these and many other difficulties, I believe that an access to the dynamics of the settlement is possible. It is most likely by 2010 after painful stalling in 2007-2008. It would be good for the parties to reject this supposition and make progress already in the current year.