Do you see any prospects for Mikheil Saakashvili’s return to Georgia and to power in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in that country and the strong positions of the United National Movement in the political field?
Such scenario is little probable within the coming 4 years because of two reasons. First, most of the Georgians still feel anger, distrust and even aggression towards him. Second, Saakashvili's party-men may not want him to return. The influence on the United National Movement has been falling during the last 3 years he has been outside Georgia. The first ten persons in the pre-election list of that party show that at the given stage, Saakashvili lacks supporters in the United Movement Party (UMP). The main reason is his absence from the country, though he is still in the political field. If the incumbent authorities create no obstacles to his return, he will easily bring back his influence at least inside UMP. Saakashvili's contacts, his influence in Ukraine and media contacts will enable him to do it.
What about are the chances of the Georgian Dream at the upcoming parliamentary elections?
Well, the Georgian Dream no longer exists as a coalition. Furthermore, it was the Georgian Dream Party that pushed the other parties out off the coalition in 2015-2016. In other words, the Georgian Dream seeks to get the parliamentary majority on its own, as it no longer needs the coalition set up by Bidzina Ivanishvili. I think, the Party is able to get about 40% of votes. It is noteworthy that the key sponsor of the Georgian Dream is still Ivanishvili.
Bidzina Ivanishvili was keen to reactivate the Abkhaz section of the railway yet during the previous pre-election campaign. However, “the cart remains there still,” as Krylov’s fable says. Meantime, reactivation of the given railway section is within the interests of Russia, Georgia, not to mention Armenia…
The prospect for reactivation of the railway service through the Abkhaz section is a topic that is much spoken about. As a matter of fact, the idea will not be put into effect for a long time. The possibility of re-launching the Abkhaz section has been spoken about since the late 1990s. However, it was rather strange to see that Moscow was reluctant to react to Tbilisi's initiatives publicly supported by the Armenian society, but not by official Yerevan. The impression was that only Georgia was interested in restoration of communications. Given that in Georgia itself the stand on this issue is far from being unambiguous, our politicians ceased making a point of it. Russia itself is certainly interested in this project, but there are many political processes, to which the Russian foreign political agenda gives higher priority than to the Abkhaz railway section. This issue has paled into insignificance, especially given the need to invest in this project. The matter concerns not only economic, but also political and diplomatic investments. It is necessary to come to an agreement with Abkhazians and Georgians and at the same time to take into account the stand of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Along with many other problems, this makes the project at the current stage infeasible.
For its neighbors – Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan – Georgia is actually the only transit country. The April war once again proved how fragile the stability and peace in our region are. Apparently, Georgia is more than others interested in peace in the region…
Armenian colleagues have repeatedly told me that Armenia was also affected by the 08.08.08 war. I think the same is true about Georgia in the context of the Karabakh conflict. Most of our political experts realize all disastrous consequences of the conflict transition into a hot phase. On the other hand, it is very hard for Georgia to offer something for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In this light, the conflicting parties should first of all perceive Georgia as a possible mediator, because everyone understands that the size of the country rules out such an important role. Georgians can provide platforms for meetings, offer models and expert support but Georgia cannot make any influence on Yerevan and Baku.
Who benefits from the unresolved Karabakh conflict? Who helped Ilham Aliyev to unleash the April war against Karabakh?
It is clear that the status quo is not in favor of Azerbaijan, like it is clear that the April war was unleashed not by the Armenian military. It seems to me that Baku tried to press Armenia, to intensify the talks on the Karabakh settlement and seize some territories. It is clear that the status quo is in favor of not only Armenia but also Russia, as in case the conflict is settled, Armenia is able to make a U-turn and join NATO even sooner than Georgia will do. Therefore, it is more than clear now what keeps Armenia's strong relations with Russia. During the last 20 years, Russia has been initiating conflicts or using the existing ones in its favor and as a tool in its foreign policy, irrespective of whether the conflicting sides want it or not. At the same time, Russia actively flirts with Azerbaijan demonstrating itself as the only country able to influence Armenia and settle the conflict within the interests of Azerbaijan. There is no force or country able to press Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia simply "poses as the adult in the room" by calling the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Moscow. After the April war, the West's weak positions in our region have become even weaker.
What does Georgia have from its quite close military and political partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan?
First and foremost, Georgia's military and political partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan is not directed against Armenia. The matter concerns a different direction of defense cooperation, because Russia remains the key threat to Georgia's security.
I think all the three sides of the triangle have different motivations to conduct that cooperation. For instance, Turkey is a NATO member and many Georgian officers get military education in Turkey. As regards Azerbaijan, Georgia's cooperation with that country gives higher priority to the political component rather than the military one. The main problems of Georgia are territorial problems, terrorist threats in case of negative scenarios, radical Islam. Georgia sees no threats from its neighbors," he says.
There is an organization named “Javakhi Diaspora of Russia” that regularly voices threats against the Georgian Government on behalf of the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Do you think that the Armenians living in the given region are a real factor in the Armenian-Georgian and Russian-Georgian relations? What are the real and invented problems in that region?
I think Samtskhe-Javakheti has the same problems as all the other regions of Georgia: poverty, migration, etc. Nevertheless, the level of integration of Samtskhe-Javakheti residents is low due to many factors. The Georgian statehood is only 25 years old. In the Soviet times neither Armenians nor any other national minority in Georgia had the motivation to integrate and study the Georgian language. The instability Georgia faced for quite a long time inspired no enthusiasm for integration of Armenians or Azerbaijanis. The integration processes regarding the Armenians of Javakheti and Azerbaijanis of Kvemo-Kartli started during Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency. The infrastructure was being improved and educational projects were launched.
I think at the given stage Armenia's role in Tbilisi's relations with the residents of Javakheti is very positive. Yerevan regularly calms down the hotheads by reminding them of their own problems and the actual lack of Tbilisi's pressure on the citizens in Javakheti. Therefore, if Russia wants to destabilize the situation in this or any other region of Georgia, it will be very hard to do this amid the pressure exerted by Tbilisi on the one hand and Yerevan on the other hand. I think local elite is gradually being created in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which will be shortly involved in the Georgian political body and which will speak the Georgian language as perfectly as the Armenian language and will represent the region in the Government. This process is going on slowly, but it already inspires certain optimism.