Political expert: Reports that the Azeri Parliament might adopt a law "On Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan" were just an attempt to see the reaction of the Azeri society, Armenia and the world community
Marat Terterov: Armenia’s long term security will be better served by strengthening economic security, rather than defining national security on the basis of the Tsarist Russian catch-cry “armiya i flot”
Despite expectations from Baku and Pan-Turan aspirations, the Government of Hungary preferred condemning Safarov's pardon. The note of protest to the Azerbaijani Embassy and Ambassador dated September 2 2012 shows that the actions of the Azerbaijani party contradict the official promise to ensure execution of the sentence in the motherland. Deputy Minister of Justice of Azerbaijan in his letter dated Aug 15 2012 assured that Safarov could be paroled only in 25 years after the verdict. In Baku they reneged on their own promises, Vladimir Kazimirov, Ambassador (retired), First Deputy Head of the Association of Russian Diplomats, Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia) in 1992-1996, writes in his notes.
The author of the notes is no longer engaged in peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict, but Safavor case reminded about different abilities of the parties to assume and fulfill commitments. Yet in the wartime in 1991-1994 the mediators were often facing Baku's unwillingness and refusals to fulfill even the documents and agreements it had sighed. Azerbaijan often openly violated and breached documents. A question arises as to whether official Baku is
able to fulfill any agreement? On April 30, 1993 at the initiative of Azerbaijan, the UN SC adopted formula 822. Yerevan and Stepanakert also adopted and confirmed that, while Baku didn't even respond. In summer and autumn of 1993 Azerbaijan refused from ceasefire for many times and even breached ceasefire after signing a relevant treaty. Azerbaijan demand fulfillment of the UN Security Council's four resolutions, specifically the provisions related to de-occupation, while it has never fully or timely fulfilled any of their demands or calls.
Kazimirov brings several documents signed and breached or cancelled by Baku. Among them was the ceasefire arrangement achieved personally with Aliyev and Kocharyan on Dec 16 1993, the protocol on ceasefire signed in Moscow on Feb 18 1994. In a week after May 12 1994 ceasefire, Azerbaijan signed "small treaty" confirming the ceasefire at the request of Jan Eliasson, but canceled it in two days, Kazimirov writes.
The most scandalous case is connected with the agreement strengthening the ceasefire regime signed by the three parties on February 4, 1995 under the aegis of OSCE. The document was coordinated with Heidar Aliyev beforehand, but Baku neither observed it nor suggested canceling, re-signing, correcting or making additions to it. Despite suggestions of Yerevan and Stepanakert to redo the agreement, Baku continues totally ignoring and even concealing existence of the given agreement, Kazimirov notes. As for the OSCE, it displays no proper insistence in that case.
There are many examples proving how unreliable is official Baku. Suffice it to say that Baku does not want to recognize survival of the ceasefire of 1994. Heydar Aliyev realized what a termless agreement means and came out for peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the meanwhile, Ilham Aliyev declares that the war is not over yet. In Baku they call the line of the contact a frontline, and Armenia and Karabakh enemies. Military rhetoric in Baku rattles, Kazimirov
"Baku presents the consequence of the war - occupation of the Azerbaijani regions - as the key problem of the conflict, while the key problem is the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Baku conceals by all means possible what really led to occupation in wartime and even denies the shortest way to the release of the regions i.e. an agreement on non-use of force. Heydar Aliyev knew that without a ceasefire treaty it was impossible to start liquidating the conflict aftermaths and adopted that line of the CIS Council of the Heads of the State in his statement dated April 15 1994.
Azerbaijan pins too many hopes with the thesis challenging the status quo. War is even more challenging, while the status quo implies occupation, tension and conflicts, war policy, arms race, refusal to remove snipers and inquire into incidents, the Russian diplomat writes.